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Abstract 
The current study examined cognitive avoidance in people at-risk for depression. 
Avoidance was assessed via a performance based measure and self-report 
questionnaires. Forty-five recovered depressed (RD) and 53 never depressed (ND) 
participants viewed positive, negative and neutral emotional images. Approximately 
half of the participants in each group underwent a negative mood induction in order to 
simulate life stress. Contrary to expectations, RD and ND groups did not differ in 
length of time that they self selected to view negative or positive images and they did 
not differ on subsequent recall or recognition memory tasks for negative information 
in either mood condition. However, ND participants recalled more positive images as 
“most memorable” than RD participants. There were no group differences on 
questionnaire measures of avoidance. Findings are inconsistent with prior research 
showing increased attention to negative information among those at risk for 
depression as well as prior research showing evidence for avoidance of negative 
information in depression. Possible explanations for the discrepancies are discussed.
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 Depression is a debilitating and all-too-common disorder. Recent estimates 
suggest that more than 1 in 5 people will experience at least one major depressive 
episode in their lives and the prevalence appears to be increasing for younger 
generations (Kessler, Demier, Frank, Olfson, Pincus, Walters et al., 2005). Therefore, 
it is not surprising that there has been extensive research into possible causes and risk 
factors associated with depression. Empirical evidence has been found for genetic 
predispositions (e.g., Kendler, Kessler, & Neale, 1993; Kendler, Neale, Kessler, & 
Heath, 1992), biological abnormalities (see Kennedy, Javanmard, & Vaccorino, 1997) 
and social skills deficits (Segrin & Abramson, 1994) associated with depression risk.  
Researchers have also proposed cognitive theories of depression. In one 
prominent cognitive theory, Beck (1967; 1976) proposed that under conditions of 
stress, people who are prone to depression are more likely to view themselves and 
their environments negatively than are other people. There has been a large amount of 
empirical support for the theory that increased attention to negative information is a 
risk factor in depression and the findings regarding attention have been integrated into 
subsequent cognitive models of depression (e.g. Alloy, Abramson, Walshaw, & 
Neeren, 2006; Ingram, Miranda, & Segal, 1998). Researchers have found that people 
who are depressed are more likely to selectively attend to negative information than 
are nondepressed people and that people who are not currently depressed but are 
known to be vulnerable to depression selectively attend to negative information more 
than those who are less vulnerable (e.g. Ingram, et al., 1998). Because the differences 
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in attention are evident outside of depressive episodes, heightened attention to 
negative information is theorized to be a causal factor in the onset of depression.  
Other research, however, suggests that current cognitive theories may not be 
capturing all of the attention processes associated with depression. In several research 
literatures, avoidance of negative information also appears to be associated with 
depression. These findings regarding avoidance contrast sharply with the theories of 
increased attention to negative information in depression. Thus, what exactly is meant 
by avoidance and what do research findings indicate as to how depressed individuals 
and people at-risk for depression utilize avoidance?  
Defining Avoidance.  
Avoidance can broadly be defined as a direction of mental resources away 
from unwanted information, experience, etc. However, within the research literature, 
there is variation in terminology used to describe avoidance (e.g., cognitive 
avoidance, emotional avoidance, experiential avoidance, distraction, blunting, thought 
suppression, retrieval inhibition, avoidant coping, etc.) and many of the terms seem to 
represent related concepts (Rassin, Merckelbach, & Muris, 2000). In addition, the 
distinction between cognitive avoidance and emotional avoidance is unclear. For 
example, Williams and Moulds (2007a) state that, “cognitive avoidance can take a 
range of forms, including intentional attempts at thought/memory suppression” and 
“efforts to dissociate or detach oneself from the affective qualities of… 
…experience” (p. 1141). Elsewhere, experiential avoidance has been defined as “the 
phenomenon that occurs when a person is unwilling to remain in contact with 
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particular private experiences (e.g., bodily sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, 
images, behavioural predispositions) and takes steps to alter the form or frequency of 
these experiences or the contexts which occasion them” (Hayes, Strosahl, Wilson, 
Bissett, Pistorello, Toarmino et al., p. 553). These are broad and overlapping 
definitions that incorporate aspects of thinking and emotion. Indeed, in much of the 
literature, researchers use terms that encompass aspects of cognition and emotion. 
Thus, is seems that a theoretical assumption of most researchers investigating forms 
of avoidance is that cognitive avoidance is closely related to attempts to avoid 
unpleasant or unwanted emotions. For example, self-report items used to measure 
avoidance are often phrased in such a way to suggest that avoidance is something that 
would be done in response to unwanted emotional material. Some examples include 
asking what one does to “Feel better” or how one “copes with stress.” Thus, for the 
purposes of this project, the term avoidance will be used to refer to cognitive and 
emotional avoidance. Evidence for such avoidance in the context of depression is 
accumulating in a number of research literatures 
Rumination and Avoidance.  
Rumination has been widely recognized as a common symptom of depression, 
and moreover, people with a tendency to ruminate are at an elevated risk for 
depression compared to those without such tendencies (e.g. Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
Thus, rumination is an important phenomenon that may be related to causal 
mechanisms in depression. The term “rumination” refers to a perseverative focus on 
feelings and problems (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirksy, 2008). As such, 
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ruminative processes are typically conceptualized as involving increased attention to 
negative information. However, researchers have recently theorized that this 
conceptualization may be incomplete or incorrect. It is has been suggested that 
although avoidance and rumination reflect very different processes, they are also 
highly related through a common factor of poor attentional control. Thus, people who 
are depressed or at-risk for depression are prone to extremes in attention either 
through over-directing their attention to negative information, as in rumination, or 
under-directing it as in avoidance (Hayes, Beevers, Feldman, Laurenceau, & Perlman, 
2005; Williams, Barnhofer, Crane, Hermans, Raes, Watkins & Moulds, 2007). For 
example, the negative emotional experience that is often brought on by ruminative 
thinking may be so painful that it leads to attempts to avoid the uncomfortable 
thoughts that promote such feelings. This theory is consistent with findings that 
depressed people harbor “positive” beliefs about rumination (e.g. believing it helps 
them develop a coping response) but at the same time also hold negative beliefs (e.g., 
it is uncontrollable and painful) (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001). This ambivalence 
about the utility of rumination could plausibly lead to vacillations between over-
engaging and attempting to disengage from negative material. It is theorized that the 
alternating between over- and under-engagement interferes with effective processing 
of emotions and experiences, which requires integration of cognitive and emotional 
components of experience (Greenberg, 2002; Greenberg & Watson, 2005; Hayes, 
Feldman, Beevers, Laurenceau, Cardaciotto, & Lewis-Smith, 2007).  
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An alternate theory regarding the relationship between rumination and 
avoidance is that rather than involving heightened attention to negative information, 
rumination is actually a form of avoidance of negative material (Cribb, Moulds, & 
Carter, 2006; Moulds, Kandris, Starr, & Wong, 2007). This is a greater departure 
from prior thinking about rumination because a large amount of research also 
suggests that rumination intensifies negative affect (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1993). Those investigators proposing the rumination-as-avoidance 
hypothesis do not suggest that rumination functions as effective avoidance of all 
negative material, but rather to distract from material that is even more emotionally 
painful. Thus, rumination may be distracting from certain negative content but at the 
same time continuing to yield increased levels of negative emotion due to focus on 
other negative material.  
The current status of the literature does suggest a link between rumination and 
avoidance, although much of the research does not allow discernment between the 
validity of the poor attentional control theory versus the rumination-as-avoidance 
theory. In one study, participants were asked to recall negative intrusive (but not 
traumatic) memories after which researchers inquired about whether the intrusive 
memories were recalled from a field perspective (from own viewpoint) or an observer 
perspective (like watching a movie) (Williams & Moulds, 2007b). The tendency to 
recall memories from an observer perspective was used as a proxy for attempts to 
distance oneself from the memory. Among people high in dysphoria who also 
reported recalling their intrusive memories from an observer perspective, there were 
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significantly higher reports of ruminative tendencies when compared to low 
dysphoric and high-dysphoric/field perspective groups. Thus, for those high in 
depressive symptoms, apparent attempts at distancing the self from negative 
memories were significantly associated with rumination.  
In a study examining coping strategies associated with rumination, two 
strategies that the investigator termed “disapproval and efforts to dismiss the thought” 
and “negative control” remained significantly correlated with rumination even after 
controlling for depression and anxiety (Watkins, 2004). The items endorsed for these 
strategies included things like “I tell myself the thought means nothing”, “I replace 
the thought with another unpleasant thought” and “I reprimand myself.” In a study by 
Rude, Maestes, and Neff (2007), it was found that a frequently used measure of 
rumination was significantly related to depression and “mental disengagement.” 
Thus, the unpleasant feelings prompted by a negative evaluative focus in rumination 
may lead people who are depressed or prone to depression to avoid thinking about the 
events altogether. Rude et al. (2007) note “Rumination is often conceptualized as 
consisting of an excessive focus on unhappiness. In this view, it might be considered 
the opposite of avoidance… Yet, with remarkable consistency, the core rumination 
items (the Brooding Scale) revealed strong correlations with indices of suppression, 
avoidance and disengagement” (p. 860).  
In another study participants watched an emotional film clip and were then 
asked to write a description of the clip (Cribb et al., 2006). Raters coded the film 
descriptions for degree of concreteness, which they used as a gauge of attention and 
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processing of the clips. Participants also completed the Ruminative Response Scale of 
the RSQ as a measure of tendency to ruminate. Researchers found that tendency to 
ruminate was significantly associated with reduced concreteness in film descriptions. 
Overall, these studies suggest that rumination and avoidance do tend to occur in the 
same people. However, they are unable to address whether the co-occurrence is due 
to avoidant qualities of rumination or a tendency to fluctuate between over- and 
under-engagement with negative information. 
In support of the theory that rumination is itself a form of avoidance, 
researchers have borrowed from the literature examining thinking processes in 
anxiety disorders. For example, in Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), an 
intrusive focus on traumatic events centers on causes and consequences of the 
traumas rather than the events themselves. It is suggested that this is an attempt to 
avoid direct reliving and emotional experiencing of the events (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000). In addition, vague and diffuse worrying is a predominant symptom of 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). Researchers have suggested that the worry 
functions as a distraction from experiencing emotions related to thoughts of  
unpleasant or unwanted material (Borcovec, Ray, & Stober, 1998). As has been 
suggested of PTSD and GAD, in depression, rumination may be a way to avoid the 
emotional experience associated with thinking about negative emotional information. 
Cribb et al. (2006) have noted “Rumination may be conceptualized as a cognitive 
style that promotes avoidance by impeding the activation of emotional and somatic 
responses” (p. 167).  
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Consistent with the idea that rumination in depression functions similarly to 
worry in anxiety, moderate correlations between rumination and worry have been 
found in unselected samples (Watkins, 2004). However, as researchers have noted 
(Borcovec et al., 1998), worry is future themed (e.g., thinking about how things might 
go wrong in the future) whereas rumination is focused on past concerns (e.g., thinking 
about how something could have gone better). The most direct support for the 
rumination-as-avoidance theory comes from a study in which depressed, formerly 
depressed and never depressed participants were asked a series of questions designed 
to induce rumination (Watkins & Moulds, 2007). After several minutes, participants 
were asked to provide descriptions of the problems about which they were currently 
ruminating. It was found that people who were currently depressed produced less 
concrete descriptions of their ruminative problems than did the other groups. Thus, 
depressive rumination resulted in the least concrete and presumably most avoidant 
descriptions. Researchers assert that the descriptions were captured during apparently 
active rumination, which would suggest that rumination itself results in decreased 
specificity. However, it may also be that participants had already switched from a 
ruminative focus to an avoidant strategy when researchers collected descriptions. 
Thus, the debate regarding how rumination and avoidance are actually related 
remains to be resolved. 
It should be noted that one study has not supported an association between 
rumination and avoidance. In that study, Moulds et al., (2007) reported that 
rumination as measured by the RSQ correlated with cognitive and behavioral 
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avoidance. However, the correlation between cognitive avoidance and rumination did 
not remain significant after controlling for anxiety. In fact, some researchers (e.g., 
Ottenbriet & Dobson, 1995) have pointed out that any avoidance measured in the 
context of depression may simply be reflecting comorbid anxiety, rather than 
depression. The finding of Moulds et al (2007) is somewhat supportive of such a 
hypothesis. However, Moulds et al (2007) noted that if rumination reflects a process 
whereby there is increased cognitive attention to negative material in order to distract 
from the emotional experience of the material, the complexity of the process may be 
difficult to accurately measure.  
Avoidant Coping.  
If, as has been speculated with regard to rumination, avoidance is used in an 
attempt not to experience unpleasant thoughts or feelings brought on by rumination, 
then avoidance is being used as a coping strategy. Indeed, coping strategies have 
frequently been categorized as “approach” versus “avoidant” (Moos, 1997). In 
addition, some research suggests that people who are depressed or prone to 
depression are more likely to adopt avoidant coping patterns. 
For example, retrospective measures of emotional invalidation as children 
have been found to predict adult avoidant coping, which in turn predicts level of 
anxious and depressive symptoms as adults (Krause, Mendelson, & Lynch, 2003). In 
addition, avoidant coping in children is significantly correlated with depressive 
symptoms (Spacarelli & Fuchs, 1997). Although these studies did not examine 
whether the associations between avoidant coping and depression remained after 
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controlling for anxiety, other studies have documented the relationship after 
controlling for anxiety.  
For instance, Spurrell & McFarlane (1995) found that among people 
presenting to an outpatient clinic who endorsed high levels of stressful life events, 
cognitive avoidance was significantly related to levels of depression and remained so 
after controlling for anxiety. The researchers indicated that participant’s cognitive 
reactions to their stressful life events appeared to act as intervening variables in their 
outcomes. In a prospective study, participants were measured on level of depressive 
symptoms and classified as high or low in cognitive avoidant coping (Blalock & 
Joinier, 2000). After three weeks, individuals were reassessed for depressive 
symptoms and measured on stressful life events during the interim. Among females 
who scored high in stressful life events and cognitive avoidance, depressive 
symptoms significantly increased during the study. This relationship was not found in 
males. Thus, this study provides some support for a negative effect of avoidant 
coping on depressive symptoms.  
One published study found that avoidant coping was not related to depression 
(Yoshizumi, Murase, Murakami, & Takai, 2007). Researchers measured avoidant 
coping, depressive symptoms and retrospective reports of parental rearing practices, 
which have been shown to be related to risk for depression (e.g., Heider Matshinger, 
Bernert, Alonso, & Angermeyer, 2006). In that study, avoidant coping did not 
mediate the relationship between rearing practices and depression levels. 
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Thought Suppression.  
Thought suppression seems to fall easily under the realm of avoidance. In 
addition, investigations into thought suppression suggest that it is a conscious process 
people engage when they become uncomfortable with the focus of their thoughts, 
which makes it closely related to, or perhaps synonymous with avoidant coping 
(Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). It has repeatedly been documented that 
thought suppression results in a paradoxical effect whereby the more a person tries 
not to think about a topic, the more frequently the topic enters awareness (e.g. 
Wegner, 1994). This has been termed the “rebound” effect. Wenzlaff, Rude, & West 
(2002) suggest that the rebound effect emerges when individuals become so 
cognitively overwhelmed, that they are unable to effectively suppress material. 
Feeling overwhelmed is a particularly likely scenario among depressed people. In 
addition, a higher level of thought suppression is associated with greater distress 
about the to-be-suppressed thoughts when they do enter awareness (Marcks & 
Woods, 2005).  
It is widely documented that currently depressed individuals and those at-risk 
for depression report higher levels of thought suppression than do never depressed or 
low-risk groups (Beevers, Wenzlaff, Hayes, & Scott, 1999; Marcks & Woods, 2005; 
Rude, Wenzlaff, Gibbs, Vane, & Whiteney, 2002; Rude & McCarthy, 2005; Wenzlaff 
& Bates, 1998; Wenzlaff & Eisenberg, 2001; Wenzlaff et al., 2001; Wenzlaff et al., 
2002). More specifically, it has also been shown that attempts to suppress thoughts 
about personally relevant depressing topics lead to increases in thoughts about the 
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depressing topics (Roemer & Borcovec, 1994) and that the rebound effect is more 
distressing to those high in depressive symptoms than those low in symptoms 
(Williams & Moulds, 2007b). In a sample of undergraduates who were given mock 
negative feedback about themselves, those with less complex self-concepts were 
more prone to the rebound effect after attempting to suppress the negative feedback 
(Renaud & McConnell, 2002). This is interesting with regard to depression because 
people at-risk for depression tend to have less complex self-concepts when compared 
to low risk groups (e.g., Linville, 1987). Thus, people already at-risk for depression 
by way of their self-concepts may also be at greatest risk of experiencing a rebound in 
unwanted thoughts and emotional distress associated with those thoughts. It seems 
that avoidant strategies may be particularly ineffective for people already at increased 
risk for depression.  
In a longitudinal study, researchers examined the relationship between thought 
suppression and depressive symptoms among adults undergoing treatment for 
depression (Rosenthal, Cheavens, Compton, Thorp, & Lynch, 2005). After 
controlling for pretreatment depression level and age of initial episode onset, greater 
suppression tendencies predicted higher depressive symptoms at 6 months post 
treatment. Interestingly, thought suppression was not predictive of depressive 
symptoms immediately post treatment. Thus, the negative effects of thought 
suppression may develop over an extended period of time. In fact, thought 
suppression may even be helpful and somewhat effective to people in the short term. 
This hypothesis would parallel findings in anxiety in which avoidance of distressing 
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thoughts and feelings is effective in reducing anxiety in the short term. However, the 
persistent avoidance of anxiety-provoking material serves to maintain the anxiety in 
the long term (Borcovec et al., 1998).  
The possible applications of the thought suppression literature to emotion 
regulation within depression are abundant. In particular, the rebound effect 
documented in the thought suppression literature offers a possible linkage between 
two seemingly paradoxical processes in depression: the increased attention to 
negative information on one hand and cognitive avoidance on the other. In several 
studies, time course fluctuations in attention have been examined. For example, 
currently, previously and never dysphoric groups were asked to listen to a series of 
homophones that could be interpreted in negative or neutral ways (e.g., weak/week) 
(Wenzlaff & Eisenberg, 2001). Immediately following homophone presentation, 
currently and formerly dysphoric groups showed a negative bias in interpretation 
compared to the never dysphoric group. However, after a 10 second delay, the bias of 
the formerly dysphoric group diminished. The degree of diminishing bias correlated 
with level of thought suppression, suggesting that the formerly depressed group was 
able to effectively use suppression techniques when given a 10 second period but 
unable to mobilize suppression immediately. In a similar study, depressed, formerly 
depressed and never depressed groups were asked to unscramble a series of sentences 
that could be unscrambled in either a negative or a neutral/positive way (Wenzlaff et 
al., 2002). The depressed group had a negative bias in their unscrambling compared 
to never and formerly depressed groups. However, when a cognitive load was 
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introduced (remembering a six digit number), formerly depressed participants also 
evidenced a negative bias and looked similar to the depressed group. Wenzlaff et al. 
(2002) suggest that in the no load condition, any suppression attempts made by 
depressed individuals were ineffective because depressed participants were 
cognitively overwhelmed by their depression symptoms. In contrast, formerly and 
never depressed participants were able to effectively ward off any unwanted negative 
thoughts. However, once a cognitive load was introduced, formerly depressed 
participants also became overwhelmed and ineffective at suppressing negative 
information.  
An additional study measured attention using pupil dilation, an indicator of 
attention allocation (Steidtmann, Ingram, & Siegle, 2010). When compared to never 
depressed participants, formerly depressed participants showed increased dilation to 
negative emotional words before a sad mood induction but decreased dilation to 
negative words after the mood induction. It is possible the mood induction served as a 
cognitive challenge in the same way the cognitive load did in the Wenzlaff et al., 
2002 study. However, whereas the cognitive load apparently made suppression of 
negative material more difficult for the formerly depressed group in Wenzlaff et al., 
suppression became more apparent in the Steidtmann et al study. A possible 
explanation for the discrepancy is the differences in time points at which outcomes 
were measured. In Wenzlaff et al (2002), attention outcomes were measured 
simultaneously with the cognitive challenge whereas in Steidtmann et al., the mood 
induction was administered as a precursor to the attention task. Perhaps in the latter 
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study, measures of attention were captured during a “recovery” phase whereby 
participants were attempting to regroup from the cognitive challenge and mobilize 
suppression/avoidance tactics.  
A similar pattern of effective suppression/avoidance and cognitive overload 
was observed in a longitudinal study (Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003). College students 
who scored low in rumination and depressive symptoms at baseline and either high or 
low in suppression were followed for 10 weeks. After 10 weeks, those people high in 
thought suppression, and who also endorsed high stress in the interim, showed 
significant increases in depressive symptoms and rumination. The low suppressor 
group and the high suppressor group that did not report high stress did not show such 
increases. Thus, among the high suppressor group, attempts to suppress or avoid 
negative thoughts may have become overwhelmed by life stressors and led to a 
rebound of such thoughts in the form of rumination, which in turn led to increases in 
depressive symptoms. The findings from this and the Steidtmann et al. study suggest 
that people at-risk for depression vacillate between inability to effectively suppress or 
avoid distressing information and apparently effective use of disengagement. This 
interpretation would be consistent with the conceptualization of rumination and 
avoidance as distinct but reciprocal processes. 
Overgeneral Memory. 
An apparent byproduct of avoidant coping and thought suppression is 
overgeneral memory. Overgeneral memory refers to the widely established finding 
that depressed people and people at-risk for depression tend to recall less specific 
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autobiographical memories in response to emotional cues (e.g., “describe your 
saddest lifetime memory”) when compared to low-risk groups. A recent meta-
analysis suggests a large effect size for overgeneral memory in response to both 
positive and negative cues (Williams et al., 2007). Raes, Hermans, Phillipot, and 
Kremers (2006) have noted that overgeneral memory represents a likely trait or 
vulnerability marker for depression and depression relapse. Indeed, in several studies 
it has been found that overgenerality predicts depression course. Among depressed 
people, overgeneral memory scores at baseline significantly correlated with failure to 
recover from depression 7 months later (Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 
1993). In that study, overgeneral memory accounted for 33% of the variance in 
depression status at 7 months.  In another study, participants giving less emotionally 
descriptive responses to queries about their happiest and saddest lifetime memories 
were more depressed 1 year later (Rottenberg, Joorman, Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005). 
Thus, overgeneral memory does appear to be related to important cognitive and/or 
emotional processes in depression.  
Researchers have only recently begun examining the processes that may 
underlie the overgeneral memory effects, but many of the proposed explanations for 
overgeneral memory have included avoidant processes. Williams et al. (2007) state, 
“In the short term it [may be] less dangerous to think about more vague memories in 
order to avoid activating affect associated with specific memories. This avoidance 
leads to a less specific memory style in general. The result is cognitive avoidance... 
We suggest that… an avoidant coping style takes some time to develop. For some 
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persons it might remain a flexible and helpful strategy in warding off negative 
emotions, whereas for others it might develop into an inflexible and habitual response 
pattern” (p.134). Similarly, Kuyken, Howell, and Dalgleish, (2006) suggest, “[A] 
possibility is that overgeneral memory is… a function of some form of affect 
regulation… For instance, overgeneral memory style may develop within social 
milieux (e.g., families, peer groups) characterized by emotional avoidance, in which 
such an emotionally avoidant cognitive style then confers a risk for later depression” 
(p. 389). Because experimental manipulations have been shown to increase memory 
specificity (e.g. Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2000), researchers have pointed out 
that overgeneral memory appears to be driven by avoidance during the time of 
memory retrieval, rather than encoding (Williams et al., 2007). That is, if avoidance 
took place at the time of encoding, the information would not be stored and thus not 
be available to emerge during experimental manipulations. Accordingly, overgeneral 
memory has also been theorized to result from frequent attempts at thought 
suppression (Rassin et al., 2000).  
Some researchers have discounted the avoidance explanation for overgeneral 
memory (e.g., Brittlebank, Scott, Williams, & Ferrier, 1993) by pointing out that the 
lack of specificity is also manifested for positive memories, which people would be 
unlikely to attempt to avoid. However, proponents of avoidance explanations assert 
that if people are highly motivated to avoid painful emotions associated with past 
memories, they may learn to be nonspecific about all memories. For example, 
thinking vividly about a time one felt very happy could lead to thoughts about how 
  18 
one no longer feels that way, feels that way so infrequently, etc. (Williams et al., 
2007). 
As with other accounts of avoidance in depression, researchers have drawn 
parallels between anxiety and overgeneral memory and depression and overgeneral 
memory. For instance, individuals diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD) described their worries with significantly more detail following treatment in 
which they no longer met criteria for GAD (Stober & Borcovec, 1998). Other studies 
have more directly examined the relationships between overgeneral memory and 
avoidance. For instance, in an unselected sample of students, overgeneral memory for 
emotional life events significantly correlated with avoidance on several 
questionnaires (Hermans, Defranc, Raes, Williams, & Eelen, 2005). Higher thought 
suppression scores have also been related to poorer memory in response to specific 
questions about recently viewed emotional film clips (Richards & Gross, 2006). In 
that study, those people scoring highest on thought suppression evidenced memory 
deficits as large as a subset of participants asked to intentionally distract themselves 
from watching the clips.  
Several studies have also linked overgeneral memory to depressive rumination 
and poor problem solving. For example, it was found that greater tendency to 
ruminate is associated with poorer problem solving and that overgeneral memory 
mediates the relationship between problem solving and rumination (Raes, Hermans, 
Williams, Demyttenaere, Sabbe, Pieters et al., 2005). In another study, participants 
were identified as high or low in trait rumination (Raes, Hermans, Williams, Geypen, 
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& Eelen, 2006). Subsequently, an overgeneral style of remembering was 
experimentally induced for half the participants by asking participants to think of a 
“type of event” whereas control participants were asked to recall “a specific event.” 
Among those high in trait rumination, inducing overgeneral memory led to increases 
in reported rumination. No increases were observed among those low in trait 
rumination. In related studies, experimentally inducing rumination among depressed 
people leads to increases in overgeneral memory (Park, Goodyer, & Teasdale, 2004; 
Watkins & Teasdale, 2004). Thus, rumination and overgeneral memory seem to be 
closely related and mutually reinforcing.  
Direct Evidence for Avoidance in Depression.  
Although the research thus far reviewed provides indirect evidence of 
avoidance in depression, only a small number of published studies have more directly 
examined avoidance and depression. During development of the cognitive-behavioral 
avoidance scale (CBAS), researchers found that the relationships between avoidance 
and depressive symptoms were as strong as those between avoidance and anxiety 
symptoms (Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004). This finding was surprising given that 
avoidance is recognized as a core feature of anxiety but not depression. Another study 
also found significant correlations between avoidance on the CBAS and depressive 
symptoms, although anxiety was not controlled for in the study (Moulds, et al., 2007). 
However, two additional studies have found that avoidance remained associated with 
depression scores after controlling for anxiety. Ottenbreit and Dobson (2004) found 
that avoidance on the CBAS predicted small but unique variance in depression after 
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controlling for anxiety. Another study measured nonclinical undergraduates on 
correlations between depressive symptoms and two questionnaire measures of 
avoidance. Avoidance scores were significantly positively correlated with level of 
depressive symptoms and remained so after controlling for anxiety scores (Cribb, et 
al., 2006).  
Notably, in one study depression scores were longitudinally predicted by a 
measure of avoidance (Brewin, Reynolds, & Tata, 1999). Among people who were 
currently depressed at baseline, avoidance scores significantly predicted depression 
symptoms 6 months later. In another study, a performance-based measure of attention 
that was suggestive of cognitive avoidance was found to be increased among those at-
risk for depression (Ingram, Bailey, & Siegle, 2004). Participants engaged in an 
emotional stroop task in which they were asked to name the color of depressive 
words. The at-risk group was significantly faster at naming word color, and thus, able 
to direct attention away from depressive word meaning faster than a low risk group.  
Exposure Therapies for Depression.  
 Exposure based therapies have proven effective for anxiety disorders (see 
Norton & Price, 2007 for a meta-analysis). Given the preliminary evidence for 
avoidance in depression, researchers have begun designing and pilot-testing 
treatments for depression that include exposure components.  In fact, some 
researchers assert that cognitive therapy for depression does not change the content of 
negative thoughts insomuch as it changes the way in which people interpret and 
evaluate those negative thoughts and thus changes ability to tolerate and expose 
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oneself to the thoughts (Teasdale, 1997; Teasdale, Pope, Moore, Hayhurst, Williams, 
& Segal, 2002; Teasdale, Segal, & Williams, 1995). Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy (ACT) is one such intervention that is aimed at decreasing emotional 
avoidance by increasing ability to tolerate and re-evaluate negative thoughts. ACT 
has been effective in treatment of a variety of disorders (Hayes, Luoma, Bond, 
Masuda, & Lillis, 2006) including depression (Forman, Herbert, Moitra, Yeomans, & 
Geller, 2007; Zeller & Rains, 1989). Although ACT also includes behavioral 
interventions, it includes a cognitive component in which people are taught to 
“defuse” upsetting thoughts and feelings by accepting the experiences in a non-
judgmental way (Forman et al., 2007). Similarly, in Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
Therapy (MBCT) people are asked to practice “de-centering” or acknowledging their 
thoughts while also interpreting the meaning of the thoughts in different ways. In 
essence, people are asked to recognize that “a thought is just a thought” and to avoid 
assigning a large amount of meaning to negative thoughts (Teasdale et al., 2002).  
This may be likened to asking people to expose themselves to negative thought 
content in order to help them learn how to more effectively manage the negative 
content when it does occur. Although decentering may be extremely difficult or 
impossible for people to master while people are depressed, it has been hypothesized 
that it would be especially useful among at-risk groups during times of stress that 
might otherwise spiral into a depressive episode. Indeed, MBCT has shown promise 
as a relapse prevention strategy. An intervention designed to increase people’s 
abilities to assign different meanings to their thoughts decreased depressive relapse 
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when compared to treatment-as-usual (Teasdale et al., 2002). Those people who were 
most able to tolerate and subsequently evaluate their thoughts in new ways were the 
least likely to relapse.  
In another application of exposure principles to depression treatment, Hayes et 
al. (2005) conducted a pilot study examining the effect of Exposure Based Cognitive 
Therapy (EBCT) for participants diagnosed with depression. The identified aim of 
EBCT is “guided exploration,” in which therapists assist participants with gradual 
cognitive and emotional processing of depressive information without making 
attempts at stopping or decreasing negative affect associated with the material. Before 
participants were asked to engage in guided exploration, they were taught 
mindfulness skills to help them recognize and acknowledge negative thoughts without 
making negative judgments about the thoughts. Participants were also taught distress 
tolerance skills to increase their ability to endure emotions experienced during the 
guided exploration. Participants wrote weekly narratives describing their depression. 
The narratives were coded by raters for level of peak processing (the degree to which 
participants described emotions and thoughts in writing without avoidance or 
rumination). The degree of peak processing for participants was significantly related 
to reductions in depressive symptoms. At the conclusion of the study, 24 of 29 
participants no longer met criteria for major depression and had experienced at least a 
50% reduction in symptoms (Hayes, Beevers, Laurenceau & Perlman, 2005). It is 
difficult to assess whether the symptom reduction was primarily due to mindfulness 
skills, distress tolerance skills, exposure, or some combination of the three. However, 
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time course analyses revealed that exposure initially worsened depressive symptoms 
for many participants, but that higher levels of guided exploration during symptom 
spikes were related to greater subsequent symptom reduction (Hayes, Feldman, 
Beevers, Laurenceau, Cardaciotto & Lewis-Smith, 2007). Thus, exposure does seem 
to be one active component of the treatment. It should be noted that EBCT is still in 
preliminary stages and further research into the mechanisms through which exposure 
may decrease depressive symptoms will be particularly important. However, research 
showing efficacy of a number of depression treatments aimed at decreasing avoidance 
is encouraging and suggests that further examination of avoidant processes associated 
with depression is a useful venture.  
Remaining Questions.  
The reviewed literatures provide empirical support that avoidance plays an 
important role in maintaining depression, and possibly, in risk for depression. A 
proposed model of relationships among various processes related to avoidance in 
depression appears in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Possible relationships among processes related to avoidance in 
depression. Solid boxes and lines indicate empirically documented constructs and 
relationships, although directionality has been theorized in some cases. Dashed boxes 
and lines indicate areas in need of empirical study. 
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Taking into account the bulk of the current findings, it seems that the tendency 
to ruminate, a known risk factor for depression, leads to unwanted or unpleasant 
negative emotion that eventually leads to attempts at avoidant coping and thought 
suppression. The rebound effect documented in thought suppression may lead directly 
back to increased rumination. In addition, avoidant coping and thought suppression 
may result in overgeneral memory, which, in turn leads to reduced problem solving 
ability and increased rumination. Over time, the repetition of the process is likely to 
strengthen the relationships among rumination and avoidance and result in more 
habitual, problematic patterns. Furthermore, in addition to having the paradoxical 
effect of increasing ruminative thinking, frequent avoidance is likely to render 
individuals particularly ineffective and unpracticed in managing strong negative 
thoughts and emotions when they do overwhelm attempts at avoidance. Although still 
in preliminary stages, exposure based treatments for depression aim to target the 
avoidant coping/thought suppression responses that may be present among those who 
are depressed and at-risk for depression. Thus, they are a possible approach for 
stopping the theorized cycle of avoidance and rumination in depression. 
The existing research suggests that rumination and avoidance may alternate 
cyclically within the same individuals and that this accounts for the seemingly 
contradictory findings of increased versus decreased attention to negative information 
in depression. However, empirical evidence that could document this process is still 
needed. If rumination and avoidance are dynamic processes alternating within 
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individuals, the time points at which attention is measured could greatly impact 
empirical findings regarding attention.  
In part, the fluctuations may depend on whether the person is currently in a 
depressed episode or depression has remitted. It is highly likely that attempts at 
avoidance are more effective for people who are not currently experiencing 
depression. However, even for those not currently experiencing depression, avoidance 
effectiveness may be disrupted during times of increased stress or cognitive strain. 
For example, Wenzlaff and colleagues (2001; 2002) found that increased cognitive 
load immediately diminished the ability for an at-risk group to suppress negative 
attention biases. However, Steidtmann et al. (2010) found evidence that an at-risk 
group was able to disengage from negative stimuli several minutes after a cognitive 
challenge. Thus, remobilization of avoidant strategies may occur rather quickly for 
those who are not currently experiencing a depressive episode. In addition, further 
investigation of when avoidance is occurring will be useful. As is suggested by 
overgeneral memory research, is avoidance primarily occurring during retrieval 
processes associated with unpleasant information, or does avoidance also occur 
during initial presentation of uncomfortable material?   
Differences in time course of measurement may be one way in which the 
paradox of heightened attention to negative information versus avoidance of negative 
information can be resolved. Although most studies to date have used trait measures 
of avoidance and rumination, research that assesses the variables in relation to time 
course will be extremely informative. In particular, determining how cognitive 
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avoidant strategies may change over time and in response to stress would further 
understanding about cognitive risk for depression, and potentially clear up prior 
discrepancies in the literature.  
Another important avenue for future knowledge will be conducting research 
using measures of avoidance that do not rely on self-report. Self-report methods have 
been extensively criticized elsewhere; one of the main criticisms has been the 
possibility that people are not very accurate in reporting on their own cognitive and 
emotional processes (see Jobe & Mingay, 1991 for a review). This criticism seems 
particularly relevant with regard to measuring avoidance. When assessing people who 
may habitually attempt to push their own emotional and cognitive processes out of 
awareness, the expectation that those people will always be able to accurately report 
on doing so seems tenuous. Ideally, using self-report and other performance based 
measures in combination would allow researchers to most fully capture the nature of 
avoidant processes as it will allow for external validation in combination with 
information about internal psychological experience.  
The Current Research.  
The aim of the current research was to further examine avoidance in a group 
at-risk for depression. The time course of cognitive avoidant processes, the effects of 
an external stressor on avoidance and the effects of avoidance on memory were 
compared between groups at relatively higher and lower risk for depression. In 
addition to questionnaire measures of avoidance, a novel performance based measure 
was used to assess avoidance. Fifty-three never depressed (ND) and 45 recovered 
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depressed (RD) individuals were asked to view positive, negative and neutral 
emotional images. As the performance-based avoidance measure, participants self-
selected the length of time that they viewed the images. Subsequent recall for the 
images was assessed after a short delay. In order to evaluate the effect of stress on 
cognitive avoidance, approximately half of the participants in each group (27 of the 
ND and 22 of the RD participants) underwent a negative mood induction before the 
image viewing task. Thus, the study consisted of a 3 X 2 X 2 mixed design with a 
within subjects variable of image valence (positive, negative and neutral) and 
between subjects variables of negative versus control mood induction and recovered 
depressed versus never depressed status. Self-report questionnaires were used to 
measure trait cognitive strategies of participants as well as cognitive processes 
utilized during the image-viewing task.  
Based on prior research indicating attempts at cognitive avoidance of negative 
information in depression, especially during times of stress, it was expected that RD 
participants who received a negative mood induction would elect to view negative 
emotional images for a shorter amount of time than would other participants. No 
specific predictions regarding the relationship between viewing time and subsequent 
recall were made. For example, it was plausible that if participants avoided the 
negative stimuli during presentation, and subsequently during retrieval processes, 
shorter average viewing time of images would be associated with poorer subsequent 
memory recall for those images. However, if avoidance took place primarily after 
stimulus presentation, as suggested by the overgeneral memory literature, it was also 
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possible that viewing time of images would not correlate with memory recall. 
Additionally, although the status of the research literature did not lend itself to any 
specific predictions about the relationships between questionnaire measures of 
avoidance and the performance-based task, exploratory analyses were conducted in 
order to examine if self-report measures of trait and task-specific avoidance 
correlated with viewing time for the negative images.  
Method 
Participants 
Participants were college undergraduates. The majority participated as part of 
a course requirement (n = 92). Due to difficulty in recruiting eligible participants, a 
subset of participants were recruited with an alternative method in which they 
received course extra credit and $20 for their participation (n = 5). In total, 45 of the 
participants met criteria for the recovered depressed (RD) group and 53 of the 
participants met criteria for the never depressed group (ND).   
Eligibility for ND and RD groups.  During an online prescreening session, 
potential participants completed an abbreviated (5-item or 7-item) version of the Beck 
Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1996; abbreviated versions 
included items 1, 2, 3, 4, 7 plus 8 and 13 in the 7-item version), an abbreviated 5-item 
version of the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown & Steer, 1988; 
Appendix A; abbreviated version included items 4, 5, 7, 8 and 13) and a self-report 
checklist of symptoms of a major depressive episode (Appendix A). These measures 
were used to identify likely qualifying participants.  Total BDI-II score was estimated 
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from the abbreviated prescreen version and was used to assess current level of 
depressive symptoms. On the full measure, scores above 12 are generally considered 
to represent significant levels of depressive symptoms and indicative of at least mild 
depression (Beck, Steer & Garbin, 1988). On the symptom checklist participants were 
specifically requested to report on past time periods lasting two weeks or more and 
the responses were used to assess for presence of prior depressive episodes. Total 
scores on the BAI were estimated from the abbreviated BAI prescreen version and 
used as a gauge of current anxiety level. In order to rule out the possibility that 
anxiety was driving avoidance effects, only individuals with estimated BAI scores 
less than 13 were recruited for either group. Therefore, participants with estimated 
scores of less than 13 on the BDI-II, less than 13 on the BAI and who endorsed at 
least 1 of the cardinal symptoms and 4 or more total symptoms of depression on the 
symptom checklist met initial eligibility for the RD group and were recruited via 
telephone and email for the experimental session. Participants with estimated scores 
of less than 13 on the BDI-II, less than 13 on the BAI, and who endorsed two or 
fewer symptoms on the symptom checklist met initial eligibility for the ND group and 
were also recruited via telephone and email for the experimental session.   
At the experimental session, the mood module of the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV (SCID-I/NP; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 2002) was 
used to verify that participants met eligibility for the ND or RD groups. Only 
participants who reported that they did not currently meet, and had never met criteria 
for major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder were classified as ND.  Only 
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participants who reported having one or more depressive episodes more than six 
months prior to the experimental session and no depressive episodes in the prior six 
months, and who did not meet criteria for bipolar disorder were classified as RD. 
Because bereavement is not theorized to represent a distinct process from other major 
depressive episodes, participants whose depressive episode was due to bereavement 
were included in the RD sample. Nineteen participants endorsed subsyndromal levels 
of major depression and were not included in either group.  
Stimuli 
 Cognitive processing stimuli were 45 images (15 positive, 15 neutral and 15 
negative) taken from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 2005; IAPS). All images selected for this study were pictures of people. 
Images were selected so that average normed emotional valence was of 
approximately equal strength in positive and negative images and so that normed 
arousal and complexity was equivalent across positive and negative images. It was 
not possible to equate neutrally valenced images with positive and negative images on 
complexity and arousal. However, neutrally valenced images were selected to be as 
comparable as possible.  
Measures 
 The Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988; BAI). The 
BAI is a 21-item self-report measure of severity of anxiety symptoms. It has been 
used in both clinical (Beck et al., 1988) and non-clinical populations (Creamer, Foran, 
& Bell, 1995) and has strong internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Beck et 
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al., 1988). Scores range from 0-63 with scores over 7 indicating at least mild anxiety. 
Although BAI scores do correlate moderately with BDI-II scores, scores on the BAI 
have been shown to differentiate between anxiety disorders and major depression 
better than other commonly used anxiety measures (Creamer et al., 1995). 
The Beck Depression Inventory-II. (Beck et al., 1996; BDI-II).  The BDI-II is 
a widely used 21-item self-report measure of depressive symptoms.  It has been used 
in both clinical and non-clinical student populations and prior versions have been 
shown to be reliable and valid (Beck et al., 1988).  Scores can range from 0-63 with 
higher scores indicating higher levels of depressive symptoms. Scores over 13 are 
typically indicative of at least mild depression. 
 The Cognitive-Behavioral Avoidance Scale (Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004; 
CBAS). The CBAS is a 31-item self report measure on which participants are asked 
to rate the degree to which they use various avoidant strategies to deal with problems. 
The scale has been shown to have good internal consistency and test-retest reliability 
as well as convergent and divergent validity (Ottenbreit & Dobson, 2004). The CBAS 
yields an overall composite avoidance score, which can range from 31-155 with 
higher scores representing higher avoidance. Subscale scores for cognitive-social, 
cognitive-nonsocial, behavioral social and behavioral non-social avoidance can also 
be derived. Higher subscale scores represent higher endorsement of a specific type of 
avoidance. 
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Subscales from the Dundee Stress States Questionnaire (Matthews, Joyner, 
Gilliland, Campbell, Falconer, & Huggins, 1999; DSSQ). The task-relevant cognitive 
interference and task-irrelevant cognitive interference subscales of the DSSQ were 
used to assess cognitive activity during the image viewing task.  The subscales are 8 
items each and are designed to measure stress during a specific task in response to 
thoughts about the task or unrelated thoughts. Higher scores indicate higher levels of 
task-relevant or task-irrelevant interference. The sub-scales have been shown to have 
internal reliability and to correlate with other measures of task related and task 
unrelated thinking (Matthews, Campbell, Falconer, Joyner, Huggins, Gilliland et al., 
2002). 
 The Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-I, Non-patient Edition (First et 
al., 2002; SCID-I/NP).  The SCID-I/NP is the standard structured interview used for 
making DSM-IV-TR diagnoses (Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders, 4th Ed. Text Revision, American Psychiatric Association, 1994).  For this 
study, only the mood module of the SCID was used.  The mood module has been 
shown to have reliability (Zanarini, Skodol, Bender, Dolan, Sanislow, Schaefer et al., 
2000) and earlier but very similar versions of the SCID have been shown to be valid 
(Fennig, Craig, Lavelle, Kovasznay, & Bromet, 1995). 
The State Version of the Multiple Affective Adjective Check List-Revised 
Edition (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965; MAACL-R).  The sadness subscale of the 
MAACL-R was used to measure the effect of the mood manipulations. The MAACL-
R is a 132-item self-report mood checklist in which participants are asked to check 
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adjectives that describe how they feel at the particular moment they are filling out the 
questionnaire (Zuckerman & Lubin, 1965). The full MAACL-R has been shown to 
have construct validity and to correlate with other measures of momentary mood 
assessment (Lubin, Zuckerman, Hanson, Armstrong, Rinck & Seever, 1986).  
The Recall Forms (unpublished). The Recall Forms were several queries to 
which participants could provide open-ended written responses. The task was 
intended to serve as a test of memory for emotional detail that might be somewhat 
more ecologically valid than more traditional memory tests. In written free-response, 
participants were asked to “Describe the six most memorable pictures you saw”. 
Subsequently, participants were asked to “Describe the three most positive images 
you saw” and “Describe the three most negative images you saw.” The order in 
which the positive versus negative queries were presented was counterbalanced. 
Participants were given no direction as to whether descriptions of positive and 
negative images could overlap with most memorable images. Written responses were 
transcribed and analyzed with Language Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) software 
(Pennebaker, Booth & Francis, 2007). 
The Recognition Form (unpublished, see Appendix B). The Recognition Form 
is a 45-item questionnaire created for use in the study. Items were statements that 
corresponded to each of the 45 images selected for the image viewing task. 
Approximately half of the items in each valence were true statements and 
approximately half of the items were false statements. Based on piloting of the 
measure, effort was made to create statements about relatively less salient image 
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characteristics (e.g., hair color, clothing) rather than emotional characteristics (e.g., a 
starving person) in order to avoid ceiling effects. The questionnaire asks participants 
to select whether each statement does or does not describe an image that was 
presented during the image viewing task. If the participants endorsed that a statement 
did describe an image, they were asked to specify whether the image was positive, 
negative or neutral in tone. Scores were computed by summing the total number of 
omissions and intrusions for each valence. The recognition measure was selected for 
use in this study over other possibilities (e.g., asking participants to identify which 
images had been previously viewed from a larger pool of images) based on pilot 
testing in which other recognition assessments yielded ceiling effects. 
Response Styles Questionnaire –Ruminative Response Subscale-Short Form 
(Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) is a 
subscale of the commonly used Response Styles Questionnaire. It is designed to 
assess ruminative responses to sad moods. The short form  (RRS-S) consists of 8 
items that emerged from a factor analysis after removing items overtly referring to 
depressed mood (see Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998).  The factors measured by the 
short form are called “introspection/self isolation” and “self-blame.” Total scores 
range from 8-32 with higher scores representing higher ruminative tendencies. The 
full 21-item RRS has good internal reliability (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
Thought Control Questionnaire-Distraction Subscale (Wells & Davies, 1994; 
TCQ). The TCQ is a 30-item questionnaire that measures specific strategies used to 
suppress unwanted thoughts. The Distraction subscale measures tendency to use 
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distraction as a suppression strategy. The scale was designed as a measure of general 
tendencies and was administered in that form. In addition, participants completed an 
adapted version of the subscale in which wording was changed from “generally” to 
“during the computer task” to orient participants toward completing it with respect to 
the image viewing task. The subscale scores range from 6-24 with higher scores 
representing higher reported use of distraction. The full scale has been shown to have 
moderate internal reliability, and convergent and discriminate validity as a measure of 
general tendencies (Wells & Davies, 1994).  
Visual Analog Scale (Oleson, unpublished; VAS). The VAS is a 10-centimeter 
line with an anchor on the left indicating “not sad at all” and an anchor on the right 
indicating “very sad.”  Participants are instructed to make an X along the line to 
indicate how sad they are feeling in that moment (see Appendix C). Scores are 
calculated by measuring the distance, in centimeters, from the left anchor point to the 
center of the X made by the participant with higher scores representing higher sadness 
ratings. 
The White Bear Suppression Inventory (Wegner & Zanakos, 1994; WBSI). 
The WBSI is a 15-item measure designed to assess chronic tendencies to suppress 
unwanted thoughts. Scores range from 15-75 with higher scores representing higher 
rates of thought suppression. The WBSI is widely used and has shown strong internal 
reliability, test-retest reliability and correlations with measures of distress regarding 
unwanted thoughts (Wegner & Zanokos, 1994). 
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Procedure.  
The procedure is outlined in Figure 2.   
Figure 2. Experimental session procedure. 
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After potential participants were identified via prescreen responses described 
previously, they were scheduled for an experimental session that was conducted on an 
individual basis. At the experimental session, those participants consenting to 
participation completed a demographic form, a visual analog scale, and the full BAI 
and BDI-II. For the majority of participants (n = 84), the BAI and BDI-II scores were 
used in order to verify that they had not become ineligible for RD or ND groups since 
the prescreen session. If BDI-II scores were greater than 9 or BAI scores were greater 
than 20, participants were debriefed, thanked for participation, and excused from the 
remainder of the study. However, due to practical constraints, the study procedure 
was modified midway through data collection such that a small number of 
participants (n = 13) also completed the SCID diagnostic interview following 
questionnaire completion. Those participants who did not qualify for ND or RD 
groups on the SCID were also debriefed, thanked and excused. Participants whose 
scores on the BAI, the BDI-II or SCID interviews disqualified them from the study 
were given a list of mental health resources before excusal. Remaining participants 
were given a brief vision test using a hand held eye chart. All participants had normal 
or normal-corrected vision.  
Subsequently, participants underwent either a negative mood induction 
procedure or a control mood induction procedure. For both procedures participants 
were asked to wear headphones through which they heard a recorded set of 
instructions for the task.  The instructions for the negative mood induction procedure 
asked that participants listen to music from the musical soundtrack of the movie Field 
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of Dreams while thinking about a sad event in their lives.  The instructions also 
indicated that participants would be asked to write about the sad event later.  This 
mood induction has been used in prior research and was found to be effective at 
inducing a mildly sad and transient mood (Ingram & Ritter, 2000; Ingram, Bernet, & 
McLaughlin, 1994; Steidtmann et al., 2010).  For the control mood induction, 
recorded instructions directed participants to listen to a series of three-note sequences 
and to count the number of times they heard a target three-note sequence. Participants 
were asked to write down the number of times they heard the target sequence at the 
end of the study. Both mood induction procedures lasted approximately 7 1/2 
minutes.  Following the mood induction tasks, participants completed the MAACL-R 
and a visual analog scale.   
Immediately following the MAACL-R, participants were seated in a dimly lit 
room in front of a computer screen.  The image-viewing task included 45 emotional 
images (15 positive, 15 negative and 15 neutral images) that were presented one by 
one on a computer screen approximately 48 inches from the participant’s faces. A 
black screen with a character mask in the middle appeared for 5 seconds between 
image presentations. Three specified orders of image presentation were used and 
counterbalanced across participants. In each of the orders, the presentation of 
negative, positive, and neutral images was mixed together. However, there were 5 
images of each valence presented during each 1/3 of the task. In order to allow 
participants to self-select the length of time that they viewed each image, they were 
asked to do the following through both verbal and written instructions before 
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beginning the task: “You are about to view a variety of pictures. After viewing them, 
you will be asked some general questions about the pictures. You are free to select 
how long you view each image. When you are finished viewing an image, press the 
‘k’ key to advance to the next image. When you do, a black screen will appear for 5 
seconds before the next image appears. ” Participants were instructed to use the 
keyboard to advance the images. In order to verify that participants understood the 
procedure, they completed a practice block of 10 neutral images prior to beginning 
the regular task. The practice responses were not included in analyses. The image 
viewing task was presented using E Studio Software and viewing time data was 
collected and stored via E Studio.  
After finishing the image-viewing task, participants completed a visual analog 
scale and a questionnaire packet that included the CBAS, DDSQ, RRS-S, TCQ and 
WBSI. The order in which the questionnaires appeared in the packet was 
counterbalanced between five randomly selected orders (order 1 = RRS-S, CBAS, 
DSSQ, BAI, WBSI, TCQ; order 2 = CBAS, DSSQ, BAI, TCQ, RRS-S, WBSI; order 
3 = CBAS, RRS-S, DSSQ, TCQ, WBSI, BAI; order 4 = TCQ, WBSI, BAI, CBAS, 
DSSQ, RRS-S; order 5 = DSSQ, BAI, RRS-S, TCQ, CBAS, WBSI). Following the 
questionnaire packet, participants completed the written recall tasks for the images. In 
the last part of the recall task participants completed the recognition form. At the end 
of all recall tasks, participants were presented with a notebook containing all the 
images presented during the viewing task. They were asked to identify which images 
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their written descriptions referred to and their responses were recorded for each of the 
12 written descriptions.  
Following the recall task, the mood module of the SCID was administered for 
those participants who had not already completed a SCID interview. Data collected 
from participants who were subsequently found not to meet SCID criteria for the RD 
or ND groups was not included in analyses.  After SCID administration, participants 
who received the negative mood induction were asked to write a few sentences about 
the sad memory they thought about during the induction. They were also asked to 
write a few sentences about a happy memory in order to counteract any residual 
negative mood induction effects. Control mood induction participants were asked to 
indicate the number of target tones they had counted during the mood task. A final 
visual analog scale was administered to all participants. Lastly, participants were 
debriefed, thanked for their participation and given a list of local mental health 
resources.  
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Results 
Data Cleaning  
The dependent variables of primary interest were average viewing times for 
positive and negative images, percentage of words in recall descriptions that were of a 
negative tone, number of negative images recalled on the free recall image 
descriptions, and total number of negative recognition form items that were 
incorrectly not recalled. When the RD and ND group distributions of these variables 
were examined for normality, positive and negative viewing times and percentage of 
negative words were not normally distributed. Those variables were transformed 
using a natural log transformation. The transformed distributions yielded acceptable 
ratios of skewness and kurtosis to standard errors (ratios between + 2). Further 
examination of the transformed distributions revealed a univariate outlier on negative 
viewing (score was more than 3 standard deviations below the mean). The outlier was 
excluded from all subsequent analyses. Thus, the final sample consisted of 97 
participants with 44 in the RD group (22 control mood induction; 22 negative mood 
induction) and 53 in the ND group (26 control mood induction; 27 negative mood 
induction).  
Additionally, several of the questionnaires measure outcomes were not 
normally distributed. In order to increase the normality of the DSSQ-task unrelated 
distribution, it was transformed using a natural log transformation. CBAS-cognitive 
nonsocial subscale, CBAS total and DSSQ-task related distributions were reflected 
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and transformed using inverse transformations. Transformations yielded acceptable 
levels of normality as evidenced by non-significant Shapiro-Wilks tests. 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Demographic and descriptive statistics for the sample appear in Table 1.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample.  
 Never  
Depressed 
Recovered 
Depressed 
Overall  
Sample 
 Control 
MI 
Negative 
MI 
Control 
MI 
Negative 
MI 
Control 
MI 
Negative 
MI 
 
N 26 27 22 22 48 49 
 
Percent female out 
of total in cell  
53.8 51.9 45.5 40.9 50.0 46.9 
 
Percent Caucasian 
out of total in cell  
92.3 92.6 90.9 77.4 91.7 85.7 
 
Percent Hispanic-
American or 
American Indian 
0 7.4 0 9.0 0 8.2 
 
Percent other than 
Caucasian, 
Hispanic-American 
or American Indian 
7.7 0 9.1 13.6 8.3 6.1 
 
Age M(SD) 
 
18.9 
(0.9) 
 
19.2 
(1.6) 
 
19.6 
(2.7) 
 
19.3 
(1.2) 
 
19.2 
(2.0) 
 
19.3 
(1.4) 
 
Total experimental 
session BDI score 
M(SD) 
3.2  
(2.3) 
3.5  
(1.7) 
4.1  
(2.7) 
3.6  
(2.4) 
3.6 
(2.5) 
3.5 
(2.0) 
 
Total experimental 
session BAI score 
M(SD) 
4.0 
(4.4) 
3.7 
(3.5) 
5.2 
(3.9) 
4.0 
(2.5) 
4.6 
(4.2) 
3.8 
(3.1) 
 
Percent paid 
 
0 
 
0 
 
9.0 
 
13.6 
 
4.2 
 
6.1 
 
RD and ND groups did not differ significantly on gender, ethnicity, age, 
experimental session BDI score or experimental session BAI score. However, all 
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participants recruited using the alternative paid recruitment procedure were recruited 
and qualified for the RD group. Thus, a preliminary ANOVA analysis was conducted 
to compare paid and unpaid participants. They differed significantly in a small but 
reliable amount from unpaid participants on age, F(1,95) = 5.92, p < 0.05, Munpaid = 
19.2 yrs., SDunpaid = 1.67 yrs. and Mpaid = 21.0 yrs., SDpaid = 1.23 yrs. With respect to 
dependent variables of interest, they also differed on average percentage of negative 
words out of total words recalled, F(1,95) = 6.05, p < 0.05, Munpaid = 0.79, SDunpaid = 
0.57 and Mpaid = 1.44, SDunpaid = 0.60  and on average viewing time for negative 
images, F(1,95) = 5.83 p < 0.05, Munpaid = 8.67, SDunpaid = 0.58 and Mpaid = 8.03, 
SDunpaid = 0.32. Thus, a variable indicating payment status was included as a covariate 
in the primary analyses. 
Mood Induction Manipulation 
Levels of sad mood following the mood induction procedures were assessed 
by comparing sadness scores on the MAACL-R responses. For each of the items on 
the sadness sub-scale, participants were awarded 1 point for each negative item 
endorsed and 1 point for each positive item not endorsed. Thus, higher MAACL-R 
depression scores reflect higher levels of sad mood. Checks on the mood 
manipulations were performed using an ANOVA procedure to compare mean 
MAACL-R scores following the negative mood induction with mean MAACL-R 
scores following the control mood induction. MAACL-R scores were entered as a 
dependent variable with depression status (RD vs. ND) and type of mood induction 
(negative vs. control) entered as independent variables. As expected, there was a 
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significant main effect for type of mood induction such that mood was rated 
significantly more sad by those in the negative mood induction condition than by 
those in the control mood induction condition, F(1,93) = 47.32, p < 0.001, partial η2 
= 0.34, Mnegative = 19.37, SDnegative = 5.12, Mcontrol = 12.48, SDcontrol = 4.70.  There was 
not a significant main effect for group, F(1,93) = 2.57, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 0.03, 
suggesting that RD and ND groups did not differ significantly on mood following the 
mood inductions. In addition, the interaction between group and type of mood 
induction was not significant, F(1,93) = 0.14, p > 0.05, partial η2 = .00, suggesting 
that  the mood induction procedures affected RD and ND groups equivalently.  
As a secondary evaluation of mood induction effects, the pre and post VAS 
scores among the control and negative mood induction conditions were compared 
using repeated measures ANOVA. Ten outliers on pre mood induction VAS ratings 
were excluded from the analysis (6 in RD group and 4 in ND group)1. VAS time 
point was entered as a repeated measures dependent variable with depression status 
(RD vs. ND) and type of mood induction (negative vs. control) entered as 
independent variables. There was a significant mood induction type by time point 
interaction, F(1,82) = 69.65, p < 0.001, partial η2 = 0.46. As can be seen in Figure 3, 
for both groups, sadness scores increased significantly from pre- to post in the sad 
mood induction condition but did not change significantly in the control mood 
induction condition. No other effects or interactions in the analysis were significant. 
                                                
1 The relatively high number of outliers was likely due to a subset of participants who 
reported that they interpreted the VAS directions differently than intended such that 
they marked near the middle of the line to indicate feeling no sadness rather than near 
the left most anchor to indicate feeling no sadness. 
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Figure 3. Pre and post mood induction ratings of never depressed and 
recovered depressed groups on visual analog scales. 
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Tests of Predicted Hypotheses 
In order to evaluate the prediction that RD participants would spend 
significantly less time viewing negative images than ND participants, particularly 
following a negative mood induction, RD and ND responses were compared using an 
ANCOVA procedure. Depression status (RD versus ND) and type of mood induction 
(control versus negative) were entered as fixed factors and payment status (paid 
versus unpaid) was entered as a covariate. Mean viewing times for negative images 
was entered as a dependent variable. Contrary to predictions, after accounting for the 
effect of payment status, F(1,92) = 8.07, partial η2 = 0.08, there were not significant 
effects of group, F(1.92) = 2.53, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 0.03, or mood induction, 
F(1,92) = 2.20, p >  0.05, partial η2 = 0.02, on viewing time of negative images. The 
group by mood induction interaction was also not significant, F(1,92) = .229, p > 
0.05, partial η2 = 0.00.  
A MANCOVA was conducted to evaluate the prediction that RD participants 
would recall significantly less information about negative images than ND 
participants, particularly after a negative mood induction. Group and type of mood 
induction were entered as fixed factors and payment status was entered as a covariate. 
Dependent variables were mean number of words recalled when prompted to provide 
written descriptions of “the 3 most negative” images, the number of negative images 
selected in response to prompts for written descriptions of the “6 most memorable" 
images, and total number of true negative image descriptive statements not recalled 
on the recognition checklist. Contrary to predictions, after accounting for the effect of 
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payment, F(3,90) = 3.79, p < 0.05, partial η2 = 0.13, MANCOVA analyses yielded 
non-significant effects of group, F(3,90) = 1.63, p  >  0.05, partial η2 = 0.05, and 
mood induction, F(3,90) = 2.32, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 0.07, on recall for negative 
images. The group by mood induction interaction was not significant, F(3,90) = 0.32, 
p > 0.05, partial η2 = 0.00. Means and standard deviations of dependent variables 
from primary analyses are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of negative image outcome variables. 
 Never  
Depressed 
Recovered 
Depressed 
Overall  
Sample 
 Control 
MI 
Negative 
MI 
Control 
MI 
Negative 
MI 
Control 
MI 
Negative 
MI 
Mean viewing time 
of negative imagesa 
M(SD) 
8.53 
(0.55) 
8.65 
(0.69) 
8.60 
(0.52) 
8.79 
(0.58) 
8.56 
(0.53) 
8.72 
(0.64) 
Mean number of 
negative images 
recalled out of "6 
most memorable" 
M(SD) 
2.31 
(1.38) 
2.93 
(1.44) 
2.73 
(1.32) 
3.38 
(1.12) 
2.50 
(1.35) 
3.13 
(1.32) 
Mean word count 
for written 
descriptions of 
"most negative" 
imagesa 
M(SD) 
2.42 
(0.46) 
2.58 
(0.48) 
2.34 
(0.44) 
2.32 
(0.53) 
2.38 
(0.45) 
2.47 
(0.51) 
Total number of 
descriptions of 
negative images not 
recognized 
M(SD) 
3.00 
(1.17) 
2.96 
(1.32) 
3.09 
(1.57) 
3.27 
(1.45) 
3.04 
(1.35) 
3.10 
(1.37) 
aValues reflect natural log transformations. 
Exploratory Analyses 
In order to evaluate the possibility that RD participants were distracting or 
repairing mood effects of negative images by viewing positive images for a longer 
time or by focusing recall on positive images, an ANCOVA comparing RD and ND 
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groups on positive viewing time was conducted. Group and mood induction 
procedure were entered as fixed factors and payment status was entered as a 
covariate. Mean viewing times for positive images was entered as a dependent 
variable. After controlling for the effect of payment status, F(1,92) = 3.05, p > 0.05, 
partial η2 = 0.03, there was not a significant main effect of group, F(1,92) = 0.83, p > 
0.05, partial η2 = 0.01, or a significant main effect of mood induction type, F(1,92) = 
0.07, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 0.00. The interaction between group and mood induction 
type was also not significant, F(1,92) = 0.78, p = 0.03, partial η2 = 0.00 .  
In addition, a MANCOVA comparing RD and ND groups on positive recall 
was conducted. Group and mood induction procedure were entered as fixed factors 
and payment status was entered as a covariate. Mean number of words provided when 
prompted to provide written descriptions of “the 3 most positive” images and the 
number of positive images selected in response to prompts for written descriptions of 
the “6 most memorable" images were entered as dependent variables. After 
controlling for the effect of payment status, F(2,91) = 0.58, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 
0.01, there was a significant main effect of group, F(2,91) = 4.34, p = 0.02, partial η2 
= 0.09. Post-hoc follow up tests revealed that the effect was due to a significant effect 
of group on number of positive images recalled among the 6 most memorable images, 
F(1,92) = 4.12, p = 0.04, partial η2 = 0.04. Means and standard deviations of positive 
image outcomes variables are listed in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations of positive image outcome variables. 
 Never  
Depressed 
Recovered 
Depressed 
Overall  
Sample 
 Control 
MI 
Negative 
MI 
Control 
MI 
Negative 
MI 
Control 
MI 
Negative 
MI 
Mean viewing time 
of positive imagesa 
M(SD) 
8.45 
(0.40) 
8.38 
(0.69) 
8.42 
(0.46) 
8.52 
(0.50) 
8.43 
(0.42) 
8.44 
(0.61) 
Mean number of 
positive images 
recalled out of "6 
most memorable" 
M(SD) 
2.54 
(1.36) 
1.70 
(1.20) 
1.59 
(0.85) 
1.59 
(0.85) 
2.10 
(1.24) 
1.65 
(1.05) 
Mean word count 
for written 
descriptions of 
"most positive" 
imagesa 
M(SD) 
2.32 
(0.49) 
2.50 
(0.50) 
2.18 
(0.40) 
2.25 
(0.57) 
2.26 
(0.45) 
2.39 
(0.54) 
aValues reflect natural log transformations. 
As can be seen in Table 3, ND participants recalled significantly more 
positive images as the most memorable when compared to RD participants. There 
was also a trend for ND participants to provide longer written descriptions than RD 
participants in response to prompts for describing the most positive images, F(1,92) = 
3.07, p = 0.08, partial η2 = 0.03. There was no significant effect of mood induction on 
recall for positive images, F(2,91) = 2.05, p > 0.05, partial η2 = 0.04, and the group 
by mood induction interaction was not significant, F(2,91) = 1.79, p > 0.05, partial η2 
= 0.04.  
In order to assess whether length of viewing times were correlated with 
memory for image information, bivariate Pearson correlations between viewing time 
and several memory measures were calculated and appear in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 4. Pearson correlations among positive and negative image viewing times and 
memory measures for never depressed participants. Correlations within the control 
mood induction are listed first followed by correlations within the negative mood 
induction condition.  
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
 
1. 
 
Average negative image 
viewing times 
 
1.0/ 
1.0 
 
.65**/ 
.93** 
 
-.03/ 
-.37 
-.04/ 
-.21 
.38/ 
.16 
-.29/ 
-.27 
.20/ 
.09 
.05/ 
.32 
 
2. 
 
Average positive image 
viewing time 
 
 1.0/ 1.0 
.05/ 
-.32 
.00/ 
-.18 
.12/ 
.20 
-.25/ 
-.32 
.24/ 
.18 
-.06/ 
.41* 
 
3. 
 
Negative image 
descriptions not recognized 
 
  1.0/ 1.0 
 
.61**/ 
.35 
 
-.35/ 
.04 
.23/ 
.04 
-.02/ 
-.17 
-.05/ 
-.17 
 
4. 
 
Positive image descriptions 
not recognized 
 
   1.0/ 1.0 
.34/ 
.11 
.15/ 
.19 
-.27/ 
-.26 
-.09/ 
-.27 
 
5. 
 
Negative images recalled 
as most memorable 
 
    1.0/ 1.0 
 
-.71**/ 
-.71** 
 
.37/ 
-.17 
.00/ 
-.21 
 
6. 
 
Positive images recalled as 
most memorable 
 
     1.0/ 1.0 
-.27/ 
-.03 
.17/ 
.01 
 
7. 
 
Word count for 
descriptions of most 
positive images 
 
      1.0/ 1.0 
 
.75**/
.80** 
 
 
8. 
 
Word count for 
descriptions of most 
negative images 
 
       1.0/ 1.0 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 
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Table 5. Pearson correlations among positive and negative image viewing times and 
memory measures for recovered depressed participants. Correlations within the 
control mood induction are listed first followed by correlations within the negative 
mood induction condition.  
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
 
1. 
 
Average negative image 
viewing times 
 
1.0/ 
1.0 
 
.79**/ 
.91** 
 
-.24/ 
-.29 
.41/ 
-.08 
.33/ 
-.23 
-.18/ 
.20 
.33/ 
.19 
.32/ 
.41 
 
2. 
 
Average positive image 
viewing time 
 
 1.0/ 1.0 
-.18/ 
-.34 
.45*/ 
-.15 
.01/ 
-.41 
.12/ 
.27 
.07/ 
.22 
.08/ 
.34 
 
3. 
 
Negative image 
descriptions not 
recognized 
 
  1.0/ 1.0 
-.23/ 
.18 
 
-.45*/ 
.00 
 
.21*/ 
.08 
-.41/ 
-.31 
-.20/ 
-.04 
 
4. 
 
Positive image 
descriptions not 
recognized 
 
   1.0/ 1.0 
-.17/ 
.17 
.12/ 
.39 
.06/ 
-.03 
.24/ 
-.27 
 
5. 
 
Negative images recalled 
as most memorable 
 
    1.0/ 1.0 
 
-.53*/ 
-.39 
 
.10/ 
-.07 
.16/ 
-.23 
 
6. 
 
Positive images recalled 
as most memorable 
 
     1.0/ 1.0 
-.20/ 
-.22 
.15/ 
.00 
 
7. 
 
Word count for 
descriptions of most 
positive images 
 
      1.0/ 1.0 
 
.75**/
.70** 
 
 
8. 
 
Word count for 
descriptions of most 
negative images 
 
       1.0/ 1.0 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 
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Due to the high number of correlation coefficients calculated, correlations are 
interpreted with caution. However, there was a robust positive relationship between 
positive and negative viewing times for RD and ND groups in both types of mood 
induction conditions (Pearson’s r ranging from .65 to .91). Other variables that were 
generally consistently related across groups and type of mood induction were word 
counts of positive and negative descriptions (Pearson’s r ranging from .70 to .80), and 
negative and positive images recalled as most memorable (Pearson’s r ranging from   
-.39 which was not significant to  -.71).  In addition, within the control mood 
induction condition, negative image descriptions not recognized were positively 
related to positive image descriptions not recognized for ND participants. They were 
also positively related to positive images recalled as most memorable for RD 
participants and negatively related to negative images recalled as most memorable for 
RD participants.  
Correlations were also calculated between average viewing times of negative 
images, recall measures for negative images, and scores on questionnaire measures. 
Bivariate Pearson correlations appear in Tables 6 and 7.   
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Table 6. Pearson correlations among negative image viewing times and questionnaire 
measures for never depressed participants. Correlations within the control mood 
condition are listed first followed by correlations within the negative mood condition.  
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
 
1. 
 
Mean negative 
image viewing 
time 
 
1.0/ 
1.0 
.05/ 
.32 
.38/ 
.16 
-.25/ 
.08 
-.09/ 
.04 
.01/ 
-.18 
-.15/ 
.03 
.04/ 
.24 
-.15/ 
-.11 
.21/ 
.18 
 
2. 
 
Word count of 
descriptions of 
most negative 
images 
 
 1.0/ 1.0 
.00/ 
-.21 
.24/ 
-.13 
.32/ 
-.25 
.00/ 
-.08 
-.08/ 
.23 
.08/ 
.16 
.09/ 
-.06 
-.13/ 
.06 
 
3. 
 
Number of 
negative images 
recalled as most 
memorable 
images 
 
  1.0/ 1.0 
-.07/ 
.00 
-.09/ 
.02 
-.20/ 
.18 
-.05/ 
.29 
.08/ 
.08 
.02/ 
-.11 
.11/ 
.00 
 
4. 
 
CBAS total 
 
   1.0/ 1.0 
.70**/ 
.82** 
-.10/ 
-.19 
.16/ 
-.19 
.29/ 
-.11 
.29/ 
.04 
.35/ 
-.10 
 
5. 
 
CBAS-cognitive 
nonsocial total 
 
    1.0/ 1.0 
-.03/ 
.01 
.28/ 
-.02 
.25/ 
-.06 
.14/ 
-.06 
.08/ 
-.04 
 
6. 
 
DSSQ-task 
related total 
 
     1.0/ 1.0 
.39/ 
.37 
.17/ 
.19 
.39/ 
.05 
.21/ 
.02 
 
7. 
 
DSSQ-task 
unrelated total 
 
      1.0/ 1.0 
.27/ 
.14 
.15/ 
.09 
.09/ 
.15 
 
8. 
 
WBSI total 
 
       1.0/ 1.0 
.35/ 
-.19 
.34/ 
.61** 
 
9. 
 
TCQ general 
total 
 
        1.0/ 1.0 
.45*/ 
.04 
 
10. 
 
RRS total 
 
         1.0/ 1.0 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 
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Table 7. Pearson correlations among negative image viewing times and questionnaire 
measures for recovered depressed participants. Correlations within the control mood 
condition are listed first followed by correlations within the negative mood condition. 
  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 
 
1. 
 
Mean negative 
image viewing 
time 
 
1.0/ 
1.0 
.32/ 
.30 
.33/ 
-.01 
.03/ 
-.30 
.28/ 
.30 
.09/ 
-.14 
.11/ 
.32 
.19/ 
-.07 
.06/ 
-.13 
-.16/ 
.32 
 
2. 
 
Word count of 
descriptions of 
most negative 
images 
 
 1.0/ 1.0 
.16/ 
-.23 
-.16/ 
-.04 
.43*/ 
.49* 
-.25/ 
-.07 
.38/ 
.16 
-.02/ 
-.01 
.05/ 
-.21 
.30/ 
.20 
 
3. 
 
Number of 
negative images 
recalled as most 
memorable 
images 
 
  1.0/ 1.0 
-.16/ 
-.17 
-.03/ 
-.07 
.30/ 
.14 
.32/ 
-.06 
.28/ 
-.20 
.41/ 
-.25 
-.35/ 
-.28 
 
4.  CBAS total 
 
   1.0/ 1.0 
 
.58**/ 
.83** 
 
.16/ 
.51* 
.11/ 
.27 
.00/ 
.55* 
 
.01/ 
-.09 
 
.09/ 
.02 
 
5. 
 
CBAS-cognitive 
nonsocial total 
 
    1.0/ 1.0 
.03/ 
.04 
.32/ 
.24 
.09/ 
.26 
-.15/ 
-.19 
-.01/ 
.20 
 
6. 
 
DSSQ-task 
related total 
 
     1.0/ 1.0 
.12/ 
.32 
.28/ 
.04 
.27/ 
-.18 
-.12/ 
-.19 
 
7. 
 
DSSQ-task 
unrelated total 
 
      1.0/ 1.0 
 
.58**
/.36 
 
.30/ 
-.17 
.24/ 
.11 
 
8. 
 
WBSI total 
 
       1.0/ 1.0 
.41/ 
.10 
.21/ 
.46* 
 
9. 
 
TCQ general 
total 
 
        1.0/ 1.0 
.26/ 
.11 
 
10. 
 
RRS total          
1.0/ 
1.0 
*p < 0.05 **p < 0.01 
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 Again, due to the high number of correlations, coefficients are interpreted 
with caution. Even so, negative image viewing time was not significantly related to 
any questionnaire measure in either mood induction condition for either group. 
Across groups and conditions, there were positive relationships between CBAS total 
scores and CBAS cognitive-nonsocial subscale scores. For the RD group, the DSSQ 
task unrelated scores and WBSI scores were also positively related in the control 
mood induction condition. However, that relationship was not present in the negative 
mood condition or in either condition for ND participants. For the ND group, WBSI 
scores were positively related to RRS scores but only within the negative mood 
induction condition. 
Discussion 
Summary of Current Results 
The purpose of the current research was to assess whether people at risk for 
depression avoid paying attention to negative emotional information at a higher rate 
than those who have never been depressed. In addition, avoidance was assessed in the 
presence and absence of a negative mood induction, which was used as a lab analog 
for life stress. The results of the study do not provide support for cognitive avoidance 
in individuals at-risk for depression. Contrary to expectations, the at-risk group did 
not spend less time viewing negative images when compared to a never depressed 
group nor did they subsequently recall less information about negative images when 
compared to a never depressed group. There were no differences found between 
groups and this was true under a relatively higher stress negative mood induction 
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condition as well as a lower stress control mood induction condition. In exploratory 
analyses, at-risk and never depressed groups also showed no differences in viewing 
time of positive emotional images. However, following the picture viewing task, 
those in the never depressed group did recall more positive images as among the “6 
most memorable” images than did members of the at-risk group. Thus, the current 
research suggests that the tendency to automatically recall positive information, 
which may possibly be used as a mood repair strategy, more often happens among a 
never depressed group than a group at-risk for depression. 
Also contrary to expectations, correlational analyses showed no significant 
relationships between negative image viewing times and a variety of questionnaire 
measures including measures of distraction, thought suppression, cognitive and 
behavioral avoidance and rumination. Of note, in large part, the only robust 
correlations found were between different subtests involving the same 
methodological task (e.g., negative image viewing time correlating positively with 
positive image viewing time and negative word count correlating positively with 
positive word count).  
Relationship to Existing Research and Theory 
The current findings are inconsistent with prior research showing evidence for 
elevated rates of avoidance and related constructs among depressed people and those 
at risk for depression. Because no significant differences were found in length of 
negative viewing time or recall for negative images, results of the current study are 
also inconsistent with a large body of research showing increased attention to 
  58 
negative information among those at-risk for depression (e.g, Ingram et al., 1998). It 
is possible that differences in how attention was measured account for the discrepant 
findings. Because the image-viewing and recall tasks used in the current study were 
novel, they may not have been sensitive measures of attention processes. For 
example, prior research has yielded conflicting results regarding whether depressed 
and at-risk groups have increased or decreased attention to negative information 
depending on time point at which attention is assessed (e.g. Steidtmann et al., 2010; 
Wenzlaff et al., 2001; Wenzlaff, Meier & Salas, 2002). In addition, it has been argued 
elsewhere that self-relevant stimuli are often necessary to reveal subtle biases, 
especially on tasks that do not require a deep level of processing (see Wisco, 2009 for 
a review). Because the tasks used in this study did not require a decisional response, 
the stimuli were presumably less deeply processed and thus, the use of stimuli that 
were not self-relevant may have failed to elicit tendencies either toward avoidance or 
increased attention to negative information.  
Of note, the finding that the ND group recalled more positive images as “most 
memorable” than did the RD group is consistent with prior research examining the 
effect of dysphoria on recall processes. For example, it has previously been found that 
when compared to a nondysphoric group, dysphoric individuals are less likely to call 
to mind positive memories to recover from a sad mood. In addition they are less able 
than nondysphorics to recall positive memories even when directed to do so following 
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study, levels of dysphoria were low in both groups. However, a difference still 
emerged based on depression history.  
Current findings regarding questionnaire responses are also inconsistent with 
prior research. For example, previous findings of increased thought suppression on 
the WBSI (e.g., Rude & McCarthy, 2003) and elevated rumination on the RRS (e.g., 
Wisco & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2009) among those at-risk for depression were not 
replicated in this study. In addition, although correlations between avoidance on the 
CBAS and depressive symptoms have previously been found (e.g., Ottenbriet & 
Dobson, 2004), the RD group in this study did not have higher CBAS scores than the 
ND group. It is possible that the avoidance measured on the CBAS is primarily a 
state-specific construct that fluctuates with remittance of depressive symptoms. 
Alternatively, the current study recruitment procedures targeted a recovered 
depressed group that was also low in current anxiety symptoms. Because of the high 
co-occurrence of anxiety and depressive symptoms (see Brown & Barlow, 2009), it is 
possible that the recruitment of RD participants with low levels of anxiety symptoms 
yielded an unusual subset of at-risk people that differed in ways other than anxiety 
from depressed and at-risk groups used in other research.  
Due to the lack of group differences revealed in the current study, placing the 
findings into a theoretical context is difficult. Even so, the finding that the ND group 
called to mind a greater number of positive images as most memorable does fit into a 
traditional cognitive theoretical framework of depression in which it is proposed that 
those who are depressed and at-risk for depression selectively filter out positive 
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information (e.g, Beck, 1967; 1976).  Additionally, Brown and Barlow (2009) have 
recently called for a reconceptualization of mood and anxiety disorders due to high 
degrees of overlap among diagnostic criteria and presentation. They propose a 
transdiagnostic model for assessment along broad dimensions including 
neuroticism/inhibition, and positive affectivity. Indeed, the inclusion of inhibition in 
such a model seems to suggest that avoidance may well be present in affective 
disorders including depression. However, whereas an aim of the current study was to 
see if avoidance was present in a group at-risk for depression above and beyond 
avoidance that could be attributed to anxiety, the transdiagnostic model seems to 
suggest that discriminating “depressive avoidance” from “anxious avoidance” may 
not make conceptual sense.  
Limitations 
There are a number of limitations to the study. Due to difficulty in recruiting 
participants as well as institutional policy changes, several changes were made to the 
procedure midway though the study; Changes included providing payment for 
participation to a subset of participants as well as moving the diagnostic interview to 
an earlier time point during the experimental session. Although the effect of paying 
participants was accounted for statistically, the variation in methodological 
procedures was not ideal and likely contributed to increased error variance on 
outcome measures. In addition, as previously mentioned, the primary outcome 
measures were newly designed for the current study. Thus, the measures may not 
have been sensitive to variations in attentional and avoidant processes. Consistent 
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with that explanation, within group variability on the image-viewing task was large 
suggesting that other factors were influencing viewing time in the sample. In addition, 
although some of the recall measures were modeled after memory measures used in 
other studies (e.g., Williams & Scott, 1988) they were modified to be used in 
reference to the viewed images, which may have altered how sensitive they were to 
variations in attention and avoidance. Furthermore, because the at-risk group was also 
recruited to also be low in current anxiety symptoms, the ability to compare findings 
to other samples of recovered depressed individuals is limited.  
Future Directions 
Despite the limitations of the current study and the paucity of group 
differences, the question of if and how avoidance functions in the context of 
depression remains a timely and useful question, especially in light of the recent surge 
in depression interventions theorized to target aspects of avoidance (e.g., Hayes et al., 
2005; Hayes et al., 2006; Forman et al, 2007; Teasdale et al., 2002). Given the 
apparently complex nature of attention within affective disorders, qualitative studies 
assessing thinking content over the course of varying degrees of stress as well as in 
response to varied instructions (e.g. to distract or to avoid) may provide further 
insights into the time course of attentional shifts among depressed and at-risk groups. 
In addition, such studies may suggest useful ways of objectively measuring 
avoidance. In turn, devising sensitive measures of avoidance would allow better 
understanding of if and when avoidance takes place in the context of depression, as 
well as the extent to which avoidance is modifiable among currently depressed or at-
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risk people. Eventually, such studies may provide information about whether 
decreasing cognitive and emotional avoidance is indeed an active ingredient in 
various treatments designed to decrease depressive symptoms. Although the image-
viewing task in the current study was not a sensitive measure of avoidance or 
attention, many performance based computer tasks have proven useful as attention 
measures in other contexts (e.g., Ingram et al, 1998, Wisco, 2009). In addition, if 
models such as Brown and Barlow’s (2009) transdiagnostic model become more 
widely adopted, it may become less important to determine whether avoidance plays 
a role in depression apart from anxiety and more important to determine effective 
ways to measure avoidance within the context of complex emotional disorder. 
Ultimately, increased understanding of the degree to which various types of 
avoidance are present in emotional disorders that include depression may allow for 
more effective and efficient treatment. 
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Appendix A. 
 
1. Have you ever experienced a period of time during which you felt depressed or 
very sad for a           period of at least two weeks (including the last two weeks)? 
2. Did you receive any treatment for this depression, either with drugs or therapy? 
3. If you answered yes to question number 1, please indicate which of the following 
you also experienced... 
You were less interested or found less pleasure in most of your activities.  
You experienced a significant change in your weight or appetite.  
You had difficulty sleeping or were sleeping much more than normal.  
You were so fidgety or restless that you were unable to sit still. 
You were talking or moving more slowly than normal for you. 
Your energy level was lower than normal for you. 
You felt worthless or extremely guilty.  
You had trouble concentrating, thinking, or making decisions. 
You were thinking about death or that you would be better off dead. 
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Appendix B.  
 
As you read the following set of statements, please indicate whether you saw a picture during the 
computer task that is described by that statement. If you believe you did not see a picture 
described by that statement circle "NO." If you believe you did see a picture described by that 
statement circle “YES.” If you circle YES please indicate whether the picture you are thinking of 
was negative, positive or neutral in tone. Please only indicate YES if you directly observed the 
described statement in a picture (i.e. do not assume something that was out of view of the image). 
 
I saw a picture that included: If yes, what was the tone? 
(Circle one) 
1 A man in overalls NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
2 A man in a blue tank top NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
3 A woman in a pink sweater NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
4 Two people wearing skirts NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
5 A man in a green jacket NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
6 Two people in orange visors NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
7 A child with sunglasses on NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
8 A man in a yellow button-down shirt NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
9 A baby lying on a blanket  NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
10 A young child wearing a helmet NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
11 A young girl with braces on her teeth NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
12 A blue eyed man with a mustache NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
13 Three people on bikes NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
14 A person on a blue blanket NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
15 A woman wearing a cowboy hat NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
16 A person standing outside in the rain NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
17 A girl in a white tee shirt NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
18 A baby wearing overalls NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
19 A stuffed animal NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
20 A man working on a computer NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
21 A man in a green vest  NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
22 Two men in red tank tops NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
23 A man who was not wearing shoes or a shirt NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
24 A woman in a white top and a man in a black top NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
25 A woman in a yellow kerchief NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
26 A man with sunglasses and no shirt NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
27 A person with part of the face in shadow NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
28 A baby’s head supported by an adult hand NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
29 A woman in a black suit and glasses NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
30 Two people with gray hair NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
31 A woman with a facemask on NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
32 A child with curly hair NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
33 A woman with straight black hair and bangs NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
34 A woman sitting in front of a file cabinet NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
35 A red haired man who was not wearing a shirt NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
36 Three people in denim jackets NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
37 A person wearing a tan shirt and hat NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
38 A person wearing a glove and a red tank top NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
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39 A grey haired man with a mustache wearing 
sunglasses 
NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
40 Two people wrapped in a blanket NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
41 A woman in an orange skirt NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
42 A man in a black cowboy hat NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
43 A woman with curly hair and a red shirt NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
44 A woman wearing a denim shirt NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
45 A girl wearing a blue backpack NO YES Negative Positive Neutral 
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 Appendix C. 
 
Instructions:  Mark an χ on the line which indicates a range of feelings.  For instance, if you were 
feeling “moderate sadness” you would indicate on the line below as such: 
 
 
Not Sad  ⎜____________________    _______ __________⎜  Very Sad 
At all 
0 10 
 
Please make your mark here: 
 
 
Not Sad  ⎜____________________    _______ __________⎜  Very Sad 
At all 
    0        10 
 
 
